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bargai[s85,jmc]		The bases for a bargain with the Soviet Union

	There might be a basis for bargains with the Soviet Union
involving matters not previously negotiated.

	There are many things we want from the Soviet Union and many
things they want from us.  Some of the things they want from us and some
of the things we want from them are non-negotiable; neither country could
give them up without fundamentally changing its character or the way it is
ruled.  Others can be given up provided the price is right.  We will
concentrate on the negotiable items, but the items that are probably
non-negotiable will be mentioned, because either side may indulge in
either wishful thinking or propaganda leading it to ask for what the other
side cannot give.

	While the previous paragraph is written symmetrically between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, I don't want to imply that the the two
countries are similar, especially morally.  The Soviet Union is an ``evil
empire'' to use President Reagan's phrase.  Since there doesn't seem to be
any feasible way of getting rid of it, we have to explore what advantages
there might be in negotiating with it.  Also while it would be nice to get
the better of it in negotiations, I believe that what can be obtained by
cleverness is marginal.  The bargains I suggest are genuinely of advantage
to both the U.S. and to the Party bosses of the Soviet Union.

	In fact they asymmetries between the countries provide
opportunities for agreements that otherwise not exist, since there may be
agreements that both sides will regard as giving it an advantage.

	The largest area for bargaining I have to suggest is some of our
technology for some of their secrecy.  Here ``our'' refers to the West in
general and not just to the U.S.  Most likely the intergovernmental
agreements would only involve export licenses.  They would still have to
pay the owners of specific technologies.

	First consider why they might want our agreement on technology
badly enough to pay something.  Their technology is inferior and they show
no signs of catching up in the forseeable future.  In the important area
of computer technology, which I formerly followed closely, it seems to me
that they are further behind than they were in 1965 when I made my first
visit to the Soviet Union.

	They make extensive efforts to steal technology, and these efforts
are often successful, but stealing is no substitute for buying.  This is
because fully successful use of technology developed elsewhere require
continued interaction with the developers.  It requires the ability to ask
questions when difficulties arise.  It requires continued access to
improved versions of the technology; otherwise one gets into blind alleys.

	I remember visiting a Chinese computer that I suspect was built
with smuggled integrated circuits.  While it was a good computer, it
wasn't going into mass production, and I suspect that was because there
was no guarantee of a continued supply of the circuits.  Even if improved
relations might permit a continued supply, it might be that what they
succeeded in smuggling represented a line of development that was later
discontinued.  When such items are bought legitimately for production
prototypes, the contracts contain agreements about continued supply and
often provide for the licensing of a second source to protect the buyer
even if the original supplier goes broke.

	Even when the Soviets are permitted to buy Western technology,
their own command economy and penchant for secrecy often leads them to
lose the benefits.  Part of the problem is that permission to buy the
technology and the negotiation of the terms involves at least the Soviet
organization that wants it and the Ministry of Foreign trade that
jealously guards its monopoly on foreign trade (a measure instituted by
Lenin himself and currently regarded as sacred).  One can imagine that the
situation is actually worse than that.  The permission probably goes
through the ministerial hierarchy above the user of the technology and the
relevant supervisory parts of the Party bureaucracy.  Any of these
organizations can inject delays into the original deal or into resupply
arrangements.  If getting continued foreign assistance might involve
foreigners finding out about Soviet deficiencies, the Party, the KGB and
the military may all have veto power.

	We can laugh at their falling over their own feet, but if we want
something in return for the technology, it has to be a good buy for them.
In so far as what we trade for access to the technology is their secrecy,
this obviates one of their difficulties in maintaining the buyer-seller
arrangements.

	Now let's consider our desire to reduce their secrecy.  They are
quite good at keeping secrets, both from foreigners and from their own
people.  Foreigners are forbidden to visit most of the Soviet Union
including the whole Ural industrial area including some cities of over a
million population.  These prohibitions include people from their
satellite countries.  The restrictions have two levels.  About a third of
the country is officially closed to foreigners, but most of the area that
is nominally open is effectively closed by non-co-operation on the part of
the Intourist organization.

	Of course, we have our satellite observations.  I don't know what
their capabilities are, but it worries me that we have depended on them
for twenty years without ``ground truth'' to verify our interpretations.
Worse, we have negotiated with them about disarmament on the basis of our
own observations of what they have.  This means that they can test their
ability to conceal a particular military-industrial activity by seeing if
we mention it.  The uncertainty probably has the effect that our military
people assume the worst and demand a margin of safety from the negotiators
of arms reduction, and this margin may reduce the possibility of
agreement.

	There is no doubt that the secrecy is a real advantage to them.
Reading ``Khrushchev Remembers'' suggests that a major advantage to them
is that it conceals weaknesses.  However, if we knew about these
weaknesses we might be able to reduce our military expenditures.  However,
it also conceals their operational plans.  We apparently were caught by
surprise in 1968 by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in 1979 by the
invasion of Afghanistan.  It will take quite a swap of technology to get
them to open their country.  On the other hand full access to Western
technology would be very valuable to them.

	As far as technology goes, partial access is entirely feasible if
we only can only get a partial lifting of the Iron Curtain.

	Remarks:

	1. What do we want beyond the right for foreigners to travel
throughout the Soviet Union.  Surely, this must involve a relaxation of
the laws punishing talking to foreigners.  Presumably, we also want the
right to install equipment to monitor nuclear tests.

	2. In my opinion the abolition of nuclear weapons is not a
desirable goal except in a world where there are no hostilities with
substantial chance of leading to war.  Abolition would make the world too
unstable with regard to a race for their re-introduction.  Facilities with
other uses that are easily converted to produce components for nuclear
weapons are too difficult to define.  Restrictions on what scientists are
allowed to know that is convertible into the ability to make nuclear
weapons.  There is also the problem of third parties.

	Another major area of possible negotiation concerns human rights.
This involves pitfalls of several kinds.  First why should we pay them to
respect rights they ought to respect without payment?  Second, improving
civil rights in the Soviet Union is a good thing, but it isn't necessarily
a vital interest of the United States.

	Different people will have different attitudes towards these
questions.  My own view is pragmatic and relatively generous, i.e.  I'm
willing to pay bribes to people who don't deserve them provided we get
what we're paying for, and I favor paying quite bit for human rights.

	Concretely, we should consider buying freedom for individuals as
the West Germans do with East Germany.  However, we have to worry about
the price escalating and their arresting people in order to ransom them.
In spite of these obstacles, I think it's worth a try.  Besides, the more
the Soviets leaders demonstrate their moral corruption, the more likely it
is that some new generation of leaders will become disgusted with the
whole system and make more drastic changes.

	The current (1985 May) news indicates that the arms control
negotiations are unlikely to make any substantial breakthrough in the near
future.  However, since the Gorbachev regime seems to be in a mood for
some agreements, it is worthwhile to explore other areas than arms
control.  There is no need to suspend the arms control talks, merely to
put them on the back burner.  Admittedly it would be nice to get our best
negotiators, e.g. Max Kampelman, to work on more promising issues.

	Perhaps there will be more success on arms control if we can
bargain away some of their secrecy.  However, they are clearly not
motivated to give up any significant secrecy just to aid arms control
negotiation.

	Here are some matters on which progress is unlikely to be made
until there are some fundamental changes in the attitude of the Soviet
leaders.

	We would like more freedom for the ``captive nations'', but
Gorbachev didn't become general secretary to oversee the liquidation of
the Soviet Empire.

	They won't abandon support for communists elsewhere.  However, the
magnitude of this support may be negotiable, but most likely only
secretly.  This support would be far less important to us if we could
acquire the political strength to apply our military and economic strength
to beating communist attempts to take over countries.  It wasn't the level
of Soviet support to North Vietnam that was the main cause of its conquest
of the South.  The Soviet Union would only grumble if we were even to
occupy Nicaragua.  The Soviet conquest of Afghanistan wouldn't have
occurred if the military men who supported the earlier coup hadn't
convinced themselves that leftist slogans were a surer route to power than
rightist ones or non-ideological ones.

	They would like our press to stop criticizing them and to stop
providing forums for emigres and dissidents.  We can't agree to that.

	Good will is not to be had in relations with the Soviet Union.
The best a non-communist political leader can get credit for when he does
something they like is ``realism''.  Realism is explained as doing what
the communists want, because you realize that resistance is futile.  When
you subsequently do something they don't like, you are diagnosed as having
gone mad.  Reagan should not kiss Gorbachev.

	What the Soviet Union does is more readily explained as power
politics than by Marxism-Leninism.  Nevertheless, Marxist-Leninist
ideology, however decayed, puts constraints on how Soviet leaders think,
the language they use in their internal discussions, and on what
agreements can be made with them.  ``Khrushchev Remembers'' and all the
memoirs by communists who have had dealings with the Soviet leadership
from Stalin on shows that the language they use is constrained by this
dogma.  It is important to remember that there is no completely frank
political writing in the Soviet Union, however secret.  It is simply to
dangerous to put on paper views that can be used against the writer.  For
this reason, political thought is almost certainly extremely constrained.
Gorbachev himself has to be very careful.  This is not meant to suggest
that his thinking actually is unorthodox.  Such a speculation would be
wishful thinking on all present evidence.

	For this reason Western analyses of the Soviet situation are
potentially influential in the Soviet Union provided they don't start from
premisses that seem obviously false to a Soviet reader.

	I know of no study of the actual role of ideology in the Soviet
leadership.

	It would be worthwhile to find an expert or at least an expert
informant.  What about Shevchenko?

	Questions:

	1. How much technology for how much secrecy?

	2. Is their draft law negotiable?

	3. The Soviets would like the West to permanently lay off on its
criticism of their human rights abuses.  This is clearly not negotiable,
if for no other reason than that it would meaning restricting free speech
and free press, since it is impossible to imagine that everyone would
agree to a bargain involving this.  However, it agreements might be
possible that would involve specific high officials laying off for a
specific period, e.g. for the balance of a presidential term.  In order
for the political and moral costs to be acceptable, what was traded for
the layoff would have to include a substantial human rights payoff, e.g.
the release of the major known cases.  If some important case were left
out, it would involve abandoning a some identified person to his fate.  Of
course, after the major releases, new cases would arise that would have to
be part of the next bargain, but if a lay-off were part of the bargain,
officials would have to keep to it.  It would be better if the bargain
were bipartisan as far as the U.S. is concerned, but that might conflict
with necessary secrecy.

	There is one kind of swap that might be relatively easy, but it is
in the nature of a swindle on them, and so probably won't work more than
once.  Every once in a while the Soviet press picks up on some ordinary
criminal in the U.S. and declares him a victim of racism or something
else.  I see no disadvantage in selling them just about any ordinary
criminal, even one condemned to death for political murder, for just about
any price they are willing to pay - even nothing.  However, the first time
they get one and see what they have, they won't be eager for any more.